(emphasis added). The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. Summary: Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case argued on April 20, 1993. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for. Cf. Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state appellees. Id., at 50-51. Indeed, racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally. Id., at 53-54. NO racial gerrymandering; race cannot be the sole or predominant factor in redrawing legislative boundaries; majority-minority districts. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Croson Co.(1989) (city contracting);Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Location North Carolina General Assembly. Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, appellants instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. Katzenbach, Michael R. Cole, Alan E. Kraus, Laughlin McDonald, Kathy Wilde, E. Richard Larson, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Dayna L. Cunningham; and for Bolley Johnson et al. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). It also sends to elected representatives the message that their primary obligation is to represent only that group's members, rather than their constituency as a whole. In the present case, the facts could sustain no such allegation. The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. 1994), probable jurisdiction noted 115 . For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre," ante, at 644, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification," ante, at 649, will be subjected to strict scrutiny. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. 4 The Court's opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. The case established that any legislative redistricting must be strictly scrutinized and that any laws related to racially motivated redistricting must be held to narrow standards and The first question is easy. by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Scott A. Sinder, Kevin X. Crowley, and James A. Peters. Supp., at 466-467; id., at 474 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. Statement, O. T. 1991, No. At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not classify voters on the basis of race. Syllabus. e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or . Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. The majority found no support for appellants' contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, 4, or Article I, 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. *, JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Constitutional Issue/Question (Shaw v. Reno). Dissenting Opinion. 430 U. S., at 155 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. 21-24 (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing "grotesque gerrymandering" and "unusual shapes" drawn solely to deprive Democratic voters of electoral power). The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. The court agreed unanimously that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 1973l(b), which vests the District Court for the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the execution of the Act and to enjoin actions taken by federal officers pursuant thereto. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). Connor, supra, at 425. Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. 9 The Court says its new cause of action is justified by what I understand to be some ingredients of stigmatic harm, see ante, at 647-648, and by a "threa[t] to our system of representative democracy," ante, at 650, both caused by the mere adoption of a districting plan with the elements I have described in the text, supra, at 685. Ante, at 653. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" 15, 1. enough enclaves of black neighborhoods." 3 Although Davis involved political groups, the principles were expressly drawn from the Court's racial gerrymandering cases. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: ''When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. electoral process. U. S. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 279-280 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) Reno. Indeed, because most of the nonwhite voters lived together in one area, it would have been difficult to construct voting districts without concentrations of nonwhite voters. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a dramatic and severe response to the situation. 639-652. -using race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous. 6 In this regard, I agree with JUSTICE WHITE'S assessment of the difficulty the white plaintiffs would have here in showing that their opportunity to participate equally in North Carolina's electoral process has been unconstitutionally diminished. As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. Complaint' 29, App. The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. The consideration of race in "segregation" cases is no different than in other race-conscious districting; from the standpoint of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in similar fashion.8 A plan that "segregates" being functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. Id., at 179 (opinion concurring in judgment) (some citations omitted). That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). As the majority recognizes, "redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors." Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. In 1982, it amended 2 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a minority group's voting strength, regardless of the legislature's intent. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Under the General Assembly's plan, two will vote for congressional representatives in District 12 and three will vote in neighboring District 2. Brief for State Appellees 5, n. 6. Id., at 133 (emphasis added). In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorizationNorth Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional reapportionment plan with one majority-black district. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. Gomillion is consistent with this view. In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: "The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. c. Answer the questions in part (b) for the minimum body temperature during the 24-hour period. Id., at 141-142; see also Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370-371 (1975) (annexation that reduces percentage of blacks in population satisfies 5 where postannexation districts "fairly reflect" current black voting strength). They sought similar relief against the federal appellees, arguing, alternatively, that the federal appellees had misconstrued the Voting Rights Act or that the Act itself was unconstitutional. The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. Where was the Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied? SHAW ET AL. 506 U. S. 801 (1992). They did not even claim to be white. A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954). Id., at 180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. Cf. As a majority of the Justices construed the complaint, the UJO plaintiffs made a different claim: that the New York plan impermissibly "diluted" their voting strength. Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. tion. Ante, at 658. But nothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See, e. g., ante, at 639-641.4 A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on . That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense . "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. UJO concerned New York's revision of a reapportionment plan to include additional majority-minority districts in response to the Attorney General's denial of administrative preclearance under 5. This Court has held political gerrymanders to be justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Shaw. 5-4 decision for Shaw majority opinion by Sandra Day O'Connor. With respect to this incident, one writer has observed that "understanding why the configurations are shaped as they are requires us to know at least as much about the interests of incumbent Democratic politicians, as it does knowledge of the Voting Rights Act." Accord, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. Other decisions of this Court adhere to the same standards. Hirabayashi v. United States(1943). Justice Whittaker, however, concluded that the "unlawful segregation of races of citizens" into different voting districts was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. 4 The majority's use of "segregation" to describe the effect of districting here may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject to like scrutiny. The balances for the accounts that follow appear in the Adjusted Trial Balance columns of the end-of-period spreadsheet. See, e.g.,Rogers v. Lodge(1982);White v. Regester(1973). The existence of bizarre and uncouth district boundaries is powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose behind the shaping of those boundaries-usually a purpose to advantage the political party in control of the districting process. A reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. A new issue of common stock: The flotation costs of the new common stock would be 8% of the amount raised. Indeed, the facts of the case would not have supported such a claim. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S., at 494. This Court's subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Fourteenth Amendment cases suggests the correctness of Justice Whittaker's view. See Appendix, infra. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it' -as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). Ruth O. Shaw (appellee) was a white Democratic resident of the 12th district in North Carolina. the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection"); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 178-183, and nn. 653-657. the purchase to her American Express card. Appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. 14, 27-29. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, Constitutional Clause/Amendment (Shaw v. Reno), 1. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. The Justice Department under the George H.W. The distinction is without foundation. Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. Ibid. A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. I dissent. where t(0t24)t(0 \leq t \leq 24)t(0t24) is the number of hours past midnight. The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti-. In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. Appellants are five residents of Dur-. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) Roe v. Wade (1973) Shaw v. Reno (1993) United States v. Lopez (1995) McDonald v. Chicago (2010) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) . Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,l legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. The Equal Protection Clause is only violated when a law seeks to hurt a minority group in voting.t. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. to Juris. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). By this, I meant that the group must exhibit "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation," so that it could be said that it has "essentially been shut out of the political process." 376 U. S., at 66-67. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989) (city contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Redistricting legislation that is alleged to be so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same close scrutiny, regardless of the motivations underlying its adoption. Post, at 671 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also post, at 684 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). See supra, at 642-643. Second, JUSTICE STEVENS argues that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when district lines are drawn to favor the minority, rather than the majority. Further, it goes beyond the province of the Court to decide this case. What I am saying is that in electoral districting there frequently are permissible uses of race, such as its use to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as well as impermissible ones. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. Finally, the highly fractured decision in UJO does not foreclose the claim recognized here, which is analytically distinct from the vote-dilution claim made there. Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind". Racial and political gerrymanders to be justiciable under the General Assembly 's revised reapportionment plan violated provisions... 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